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Abstract
This paper documents large cross-country variation in the relationship between bank competition and
bank stability and explores market, regulatory and institutional features that can explain this variation. We
show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks’ risk taking incentives in countries
with stricter activity restrictions, more homogenous bank revenue structures, more generous deposit insur-
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1 Introduction
The impact of bank competition on financial stability remains a widely debated and controversial issue, both
among policymakers and academics.1 The belief that fiercer competition among banks would lead to a more
effective banking system initiated a deregulating spiral in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While the deregulation
of branching and activity restrictions may have resulted in more intense competition among banks, with positive
repercussions for financial depth (?, ?), income distribution (?), growth (?) and efficiency (?), it may as well
have had the unintended consequence of increasing banking sector instability (see e.g., ? and ?). Similarly, the
international process of banking liberalization has gone hand in hand with an increased occurrence of systemic
banking crises in the last two decades of the 20th century2, culminating in the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009. However, there is no academic consensus on whether bank competition leads to more or less stability in
the banking system.
A similarly inconclusive debate has been led on the effect of the regulatory framework on banks’ risk-taking
incentives and ultimately bank stability. On the one hand, capital requirements and restrictions on interest rates
and banks’ activities are seen as fostering stability (?); on the other hand, they might lead to rent-seeking and
might prevent banks from reaping necessary diversification and scale benefits. The role of deposit insurance
schemes has been especially controversial. While often introduced to protect small depositors’ lifetime savings
and to prevent bank runs, they also provide perverse incentives to banks to take aggressive and excessive risks.
These perverse incentives are held less in check in weak supervisory frameworks (?).
This paper combines the two literatures and provides empirical evidence that the relationship between
competition and stability varies across markets with different regulatory frameworks, market structures and
levels of institutional development. While we show, on average, a positive relationship between banks’ market
power, as measured by the Lerner index, and banks’ stability, as measured by the Z-score (a gauge of banks’
distance to insolvency), we find large cross-country variation in this relationship. Our results suggest that an
increase in competition is associated with a larger rise in banks’ risk taking incentives in countries with stricter
1See ?, ?, ? and ? as well as ? and ?. For a recent on-line debate on this topic, see http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/205.
2For a detailed overview of the timing of systemic banking crises and the timing of deregulation, we refer to ? and ?, respectively.
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activity restrictions, more homogenous bank revenue structures, more generous deposit insurance and more
effective systems of credit information sharing.
Exploring the variation in the competition-stability relationship is important for academics and policy mak-
ers alike. The academic debate on the effect of competition on bank stability has been inconclusive to date
and by exploring factors that can explain cross-country variation in the relationship, this paper contributes to
the resolution of the puzzle. Policy makers have been concerned about the effect of deregulation and the con-
sequent impact of competition on bank stability but have also discussed different elements of the regulatory
framework that have both an impact on competition and directly on stability, including deposit insurance, capi-
tal regulation and activity restrictions. After the recent crisis, there are reform suggestions focusing on activity
restrictions, capital standards, deposit insurance and the institutional structure of supervision. This paper shows
a critical role for the regulatory framework in explaining the variation across countries and over time in the
relationship between competition and stability and has therefore important policy repercussions.3 For example,
we conduct a simulation that mimics a post-crisis scenario with more generous deposit insurance schemes and
stronger restrictions on bank activities and, hence, more herding.4 The relationship between market power and
soundness is almost twice as large compared to the average country in the absence of such a change, suggesting
a very negative impact of competition on stability in this scenario. In the base scenario, a one standard devia-
tion reduction in market power leads to a drop in the Z-score of 17%. In our fictitious post-crisis scenario5, a
similar loss in market power leads to a 37% reduction in the average Z-score. This economically large effect of
regulatory reform comes in addition to any direct effect (positive or negative) that such reforms might have on
banks’ stability. It also widens the trade-off between positive effects of competition on efficiency, on the one
3If such a country-specifc factor affects both competition and banking sector stability, then a spurious relationship between com-
petition and stability may be the outcome. Therefore, by including country-year fixed effects, we only exploit the within country-year
variation in bank market power and bank soundness. More detailed information is in the Methodology section.
4This simulation scenario, which reflects recent regulatory reforms or reform suggestions, is based on the results reported in Table
6.
5The results of this fictitious post-crisis scenario are similar whether or not we include the period 2007-2009 in the estimation. In
a robustness check, we show that neither the 2007-09 crisis in particular or other systemic banking crisis in general affect our main
findings.
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hand, and negative effects of competition on stability.
Our paper builds on a rich theoretical and empirical literature exploring the relationship between compe-
tition and stability in the banking system.6 On the one hand, the competition-fragility view posits that more
competition among banks leads to more fragility. This “charter value” view of banking, as theoretically mod-
eled by ? and ?, sees banks as choosing the risk of their asset portfolio. Bank owners, however, have incentives
to shift risks to depositors, as in a world of limited liability they only participate in the up-side part of this risk
taking. In a more competitive environment with more pressure on profits, banks have higher incentives to take
more excessive risks, resulting in higher fragility. On the other hand, in systems with restricted entry and there-
fore limited competition, banks have better profit opportunities, capital cushions and therefore fewer incentives
to take aggressive risks, with positive repercussions for financial stability. In addition, in a more competitive
environment, banks earn fewer informational rents from their relationship with borrowers, reducing their in-
centives to properly screen borrowers, again increasing the risk of fragility (?, ?, ?). The competition-stability
hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that more competitive banking systems result in more, rather than less,
stability. Specifically, ? show that lower lending rates reduce the entrepreneurs’ cost of borrowing and increase
the success rate of entrepreneurs’ investments. As a consequence, banks will face lower credit risk on their
loan portfolio in more competitive markets, which should lead to increased banking sector stability. However,
more recent extensions of the ? model that allow for imperfect correlation in loan defaults (?; ?) show that the
relationship between competition and risk is U-shaped. Hence, the impact of an increase in competition can go
either way, depending on other factors and the existing intensity of competition.7
6For an excellent overview of the existing (pre-2008) models and empirical evidence on the relationship between competition and
stability, see ? and ?.
7? extends the ? model and allows for risk choices made by borrowers as well as banks. If lending rates decline due to more
competition, banks have less to lose in case a borrower defaults. Hence, a bank may find it optimal to switch to financing riskier
projects, which overturns the ? results. Other authors have also shown that more intense competition may induce banks to (i) switch
to more risky, opaque borrowers (?), and (ii) acquire less information on borrowers (?). ? provide empirical evidence of a margin as
well as a risk effect. Exploiting exogenous variation in market contestability, they find that deregulation explains at least 10% of the
rise in bankruptcy rates. However, they also find that credit risk, measured as the loss rate on loans, decreases following deregulation.
Thus, while banks made more bad loans, which explains the increase in bankruptcies, the default risk among all borrowers fell. This
suggests that banks increased credit to both existing low risk customers as well as new, riskier ones, because of banks’ enhanced ability
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Numerous authors have used different samples, risk measures and competition proxies to discriminate be-
tween the competition-fragility and competition-stability view.8 Empirical studies for specific countries – most
for the U.S. – have not come to conclusive evidence for either a stability-enhancing or a stability-undermining
role of competition. The cross-country literature has found that more concentrated banking systems are less
likely to suffer a systemic banking crisis as are more competitive banking systems (?; ?). There is also evidence
that banks in more competitive banking systems hold more capital, thus compensating for potentially higher
risks they are taking (?, ?).
Unlike previous papers we do not test the validity of one of the two hypotheses on the relationship between
competition and stability, but rather their relative importance and strength as function of the market, regulatory
and institutional framework in which banks operate. Specifically, building on existing literature, we argue that
country-specific features may affect the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between competition
and stability via three possible channels. First, a certain type of regulation may limit the extent to which banks
can or will engage in riskier activities if their franchise values are eroded. This would thus influence the
strength of the competition-fragility relationship. Second, country-specific characteristics may also affect the
adverse selection problem that banks face if they charge higher loan interest rates. This would thus influence the
strength of the competition-stability relationship. Third, institutional characteristics may affect the proportion
of systematic and idiosyncratic risk in loan defaults and may make it hence more likely that the data favor one
theory over the other. The relative importance of each of these three channels may explain why different studies
obtain different results in terms of magnitude or even sign. That is, certain country-specific features may make
the assumptions and predictions of a given theoretical model more realistic. Building on existing theories, we
will relate different country characteristics to the overall impact of market power on stability in section 3.3.
While this paper builds on the cross-country literature on the competition-stability relationship, it is the
first - to the best of our knowledge - to explore the heterogeneity of this link across countries and over time
and thus connects directly to the current debate on regulatory reforms. It is important to note some limitations
of our analysis, however. First, we focus on a specific measure of bank competition, the Lerner index. Since
to discriminate between different levels of risk.
8For an overview, see ?.
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we want to exploit cross-country heterogeneity of the competition-stability relationship, we cannot use indi-
cators of competition at the country level, such as the H-statistic. Nevertheless, we show that in our sample,
the country-averaged Lerner index is meaningfully and statistically related to other competition and market
structure measures. Second, and for the same reason, we focus on a bank-level indicator of stability rather than
indicators of systemic distress. It is important to stress, therefore, that we do not want to settle the competition-
stability debate, but rather show the importance of cross-country heterogeneity and the need to take into account
regulatory and other policies when assessing the effect of competition on stability. Nevertheless, we conduct
numerous robustness tests regarding the choice of the market power and bank soundness measure and refer
to these results throughout the paper. Third, this paper does not investigate the direct impact of regulation on
competition or risk, questions that have been the topic of previous research. Rather, we focus on the impact
of regulation on the competition-stability trade-off. The former effects are controlled for by including time-
varying country fixed effects, which imply that we only exploit the within-country year information in market
power and stability. Fourth, in this study, we focus on the estimated net effect of bank market power on stability,
which is the combination of the three underlying relationships discussed above. Analyzing whether this change
is due to either of these three effects requires an alternative setup in which an (unexpected) change in regulation
is used as a natural experiment.
2 Methodology
In the literature, there are two main approaches to assessing the relationship between competition and stability: a
multiple country or single country setup. In a cross-country setup, one provides insight into the average relation-
ship between competition and stability for the set of countries under investigation (e.g.: developing countries
as in ?, developed countries as in ?, the European Union as in ?), while controlling for other country-specific
factors such as macro-economic conditions, regulation and supervision. However, single country studies (such
as ?, ?, ?, ?) document a large degree of variation in the competition-stability relationship. We therefore use
the following setup:
6
Riski;j;t = c+ j;t  Competitioni;j;t 1 +  Xi;j;t 1 + j;t + "i;j;t (1)
In this setup, the indices i; j ; t stand respectively for bank, country and time. The relationship between
competition and risk, j;t, is allowed to vary across countries and over time. The vector of bank-specific
variables, Xi;j;t 1, characterizes a bank’s business model. In particular, we include proxies for the funding
structure (share of wholesale funding in total funding), asset (loans to assets ratio) and revenue mix (share of
non-interest income in total income) as well as bank size (natural logarithm of total assets), credit risk (loan loss
provisions to interest income) and asset growth. In addition, we include specialization dummies to allow for
different intercepts for commercial banks, saving banks and cooperatives. Summary statistics on these variables
are reported in Table 1.9 Furthermore, time-varying country-fixed effects are also included, j;t (i.e., a dummy
variable for each country-year pair).
As hypothesized in the introduction, j;t is modelled as a function of country-specific factors. To gain
insight in the potential drivers of heterogeneity in , we run the following regression:
Riski;j;t = c+ (0 + 1Zj;t)  Competitioni;j;t 1 + Xi;j;t 1 + j;t + "i;j;t (2)
where Zj;t is either just one of the country-specific characteristics or a vector containing all of them. We
are interested in the 1 coefficients that directly gauge the impact of different country characteristics on the
competition-stability relationship. We also include country-time fixed effects, j;t. Many other papers have
documented that regulation, supervision and the business cycle may have an impact on competition and market
9These variables are often used in similar studies. See e.g.: ?; ? or ?. Banks in our sample are on average smaller, have less wholesale
funding and a lower share of non-interest revenue compared to, for example, ?. This is due to differences in sample composition. We
include all banks, whereas they focus on listed banks only. If we exclude the smaller banks up to the point that the average bank size is
similar in both samples, we obtain a similar average share of wholesale funding and non-interest revenue. The loans to total assets ratio
is similar to, for instance, ?, who report 0.61 and 0.57 respectively. The loan loss provisions to net interest revenues is also used by ?.
Their sample is restricted to one year (2001) and covers the ten largest banks in 48 countries. They report an average of 0.23. In our
sample, the average is lower (0.15).This need not be surprising as many countries were in a recession in 2001. When we try to mimic
their sample (only using data from 2001 and focus on large banks (ln(TA)>10), which leaves us approximately the same number of
observations as their sample), we obtain a ratio of 0.20, which is in line with the number they report.
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structure, as well as banking system stability and bank crises. This could create a spurious correlation between
market power and stability driven by a third country-specific variable. We reduce this possibility by only
exploiting the within country-year variation.10 In addition, the country-year fixed effects also absorb the impact
of global factors affecting the relationship. Furthermore, we also cluster the error terms on the country-year
level.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
To gauge the relationship between bank competition and stability, we combine data from several sources. We
obtain information on banks’ balance sheets and income statements from Bankscope, which is a database
compiled by Fitch/Bureau Van Dijk that contains information on banks around the globe, based on publicly
available data-sources. We have data available for the period of 1994   2009. If banks report information
at the consolidated level, we delete the unconsolidated entries of the group from the sample to avoid double
counting. We apply a number of selection criteria to arrive at our sample. First, we exclude countries for which
we have information on fewer than 50 bank-year observations. Second, we limit our analysis to commercial,
saving and cooperative banks, which represent, respectively, 53:4%, 28:2% and 18:4% of the sample. Third,
we delete banks that report information for fewer than three consecutive years, as our risk measure is computed
over rolling windows of three years.11 Fourth, we drop bank-year observations that do not have data available
on basic variables. Subsequently, we winsorize all variables at the 1 percent level to mitigate the impact of
outliers. While most of the bank-specific variables are ratios, variables in levels (such as size) are expressed in
10In mathematical terms, an (un)observed country-specific variable Zj;t may affect the average level of risk and competi-
tion in a country in a given year (Riskj;t and Competitionj;t). This may create a spurious relationship between Riski;j;t
and Competitioni;j;t. This paper’s setup examines the relationship between (Riski;j;t   Riskj;t) and (Competitioni;j;t  
Competitionj;t) and how this relationship varies because of Zj;t.
11One of the components of the Z-score, the bank soundness measure, is an indicator of profit volatility. As we use accounting
information, we compute volatility of return on assets over a three year (rolling) window. More detailed info on the construction of the
variables follows in the next section.
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2007 US dollars.
The bank-specific data are linked to various country-level databases that contain information on the regu-
latory framework, strength of supervision and other institutional features. More specifically, we employ data
from the three waves (1997, 2001 and 2005) of the Bank Regulation and Supervision database12 compiled by
the World Bank (?). Additional information is obtained from the World Development Indicators and the Doing
Business database. A detailed list of the country-level variables used and the database from which they are
collected can be found in Appendix A. Filtering the bank-specific database and matching it with the country-
level databases yields a sample of banks from 79 countries. The sample consists of a mix of developed and
developing countries (see Appendix B).
3.2 Indicators of market power and bank soundness
In order to test for cross-country and cross-time variation in the bank competition-stability relationship, we
need indicators of competition and stability that vary on the bank-level over time, as indicators on the country
level would not allow us to exploit the cross-country heterogeneity in the relationship between the two. We
therefore focus on two standard indicators of banks’ market power and soundness, respectively, which we will
discuss in depth in the following two subsections.
3.2.1 The Lerner index: measure of pricing power
The Lerner index is the only measurable market power indicator, besides market share, that varies at the bank
level. The Lerner index is a proxy for current and future profits stemming from pricing power. As such, it
fits well with the theoretical concept of banks’ franchise value. Market share, on the other hand, not only is a
proxy for pricing power, but also captures the rents extracted from being too-big-to-fail. Hence, market share
as a proxy for pricing power is subject to measurement error in a similar fashion as Tobin’s Q (?). Moreover,
the Lerner index captures both the impact of pricing power on the asset and funding side of the bank. Finally,
the Lerner index does not necessitate to define the geographical market, in contrast to market share or market
12The four regulatory measures we use are pre-constructed indices. The construction of the indices as well as the underlying survey
questions are described in detail in the book ‘Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern’ by ?.
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concentration measures.13 Conditional on having an estimate of the price and marginal cost, we can construct
the Lerner index for each bank and each year, as follows:
Lerneri;t =
Pi;t  MCi;t
Pi;t
(3)
where Pi;t is proxied by the ratio of total operating income to total assets. As banks have the opportunity to
expand their activities into non-interest generating activities, we include both interest and non-interest revenues.
The marginal cost, MCi;t, is derived from a translog cost function (as explained in Appendix C). Table 1
presents summary statistics on the variables needed to construct the Lerner index (middle panel) as well as the
estimated Lerner index (lower panel). The average Lerner index at the country level is 12:4%, but varies across
countries, from  5% in Thailand to 30:3% in Saudi Arabia (see Appendix B). The bottom panel of Table 1
shows that most of the variation in the Lerner index is between banks as opposed to within banks over time.
Interestingly, we also find a larger variation across banks for a given country and year than between countries.
<Insert Table 1 around here>
In many other cross-country studies that examine the bank competition-stability relationship, authors have
relied on country-level measures of market power or market structure. For aforementioned reasons, these
measures can not be used in this setup. However, the results in Table 2 indicate that aggregate Lerner indices
are meaningfully and statistically related with other measures of competition and market structure. Table 2
provides correlations between non-structural measures of market power and concentration, such as the number
of banks, the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index, a CR3 concentration ratio as well as a structural indicator of
competition, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (?). All these indicators are measured at the country-year level.
In addition, we also include the country average of the Lerner index and market share. We define all measures
such that an increase in the measure indicates less competition.14
<Insert Table 2 around here>
13Admittedly, one has to make a choice of the scope of the market when estimating the cost function. In the reported results, we
estimate the cost function by country. However, using average cost rather than marginal cost (which does not necessitate defining the
relevant market) or estimating a global cost function lead to very similar results.
14More specifically, we take the inverse number of banks and the negative of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic.
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The Lerner index is positively related to all other indicators and the correlation is significant for all but the
Herfindahl index. In addition, the correlation table shows that all significant correlations are positive (except the
one between the H-statistic and the number of banks). To conclude, the Lerner index is preferred over all other
proxies both from a modelling perspective (variation across banks) as well as from a theoretical perspective
(current and future pricing power constitute a bank’s franchise value, which lies at the core of the theoretical
models). It is reassuring, however, that our preferred competition proxy, the Lerner index, is significantly
related to other competition proxies.
3.2.2 The Z-Score: measure of bank soundness
Bank risk is measured using the natural logarithm of the Z-score (as in e.g. ?, ?, ? and many others). The
Z-score measures the distance from insolvency (?) and is calculated as
Zi;t =
ROAi;t + (E=A)i;t
(ROA)i;t
(4)
where ROA is return on assets, E=A denotes the equity to asset ratio and (ROA) is the standard deviation of
return on assets. We use a three-year rolling time window, rather than the full sample period, to compute the
standard deviation of ROA to allow for time variation in the denominator of the Z-score. This approach avoids
that the variation in Z-scores within banks over time is exclusively driven by variation in the levels of capital
and profitability (?). Moreover, given the unbalanced nature of our panel dataset, it avoids that the denominator
is computed over different window lengths for different banks. The Z-score can be interpreted as the number of
standard deviations by which returns would have to fall from the mean to wipe out all equity in the bank (?). A
higher Z-score implies a lower probability of insolvency, providing a more direct measure of soundness than,
for example, simple leverage measures. Because the Z-score is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of
Z-score to smooth out higher values.15 Table 1 shows that the average value of ln(Z-score) slightly exceeds four
with a standard deviation of 1:32. The average Z-score ranges from 4:97 in Switzerland to 2:37 in Uruguay
(see Appendix B). The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that - as in the case of the Lerner index - most of the
15Others have used the transformation ln(1+Z-score) to avoid truncating the dependent variable at zero. We take the natural logarithm
after winsorizing the data at the 1% level. As none of the Z-scores is lower than zero after winsorizing, this approach is similar, save
for a rescaling, to the former approach and winsorizing after the transformation.
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variation is between banks rather than over time within a given bank. We also find a larger variation across
banks within a specific country and year than across countries.
3.2.3 Lerner index and Z-score: a spurious correlation?
One concern in our empirical analysis is that Lerner index and Z-score both include profitability in the nu-
merator and any positive relationship between the two might thus be mechanical rather than economically
meaningful. As a first approach, we therefore gauge the relationship between the Lerner index and Z-score over
time as well as between Lerner index and the denominator of the Z-score, profit volatility. Figure 1 provides
information on the time series evolution of the Lerner index, the Z-score as well as the denominator of the latter,
i.e. profit volatility. The variables are first averaged by country and then across countries, to give equal weight
to each country. The values of the market power measure (the Lerner index) are measured at the right-hand
axis, while the values of the Z-score on the left-hand axis.
<Insert Figure 1 around here>
There is a close correspondence between the time series pattern of bank soundness (Z-score) and bank
market power, which documents that competition and fragility are positively correlated over time. The lower
graph, which plots the Lerner index and the volatility of bank profits, confirms this finding. An increase in
market power is associated with a reduction of profit volatility. As both plots yield a similar insight, this
is already a first indication that the empirical relationship between the Lerner index and the Z-score is not
spuriously created by including bank profits in the numerator of the Z-score. Below, we provide further evidence
that our main results are not driven by a spurious relationship between the Z-score and the Lerner index.
3.3 Country-level indicators of herding, regulation and institutional environment
We now discuss how different country-specific factors may create cross-country variation in the competition-
stability relationship. Our hypothesis tests are informed by existing theories that show a differential impact of
various policies on bank stability, when the degree of competition varies. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics
for the different country-level variables, while Table 4 reports correlations. All variables exhibit substantial
12
variation, both over time and across countries, as documented by the within-country and between-countries
variation.
<Insert Table 3 around here>
<Insert Table 4 around here>
3.3.1 Institutional and financial development
A first set of country traits that can influence the competition-stability relationship is the institutional framework
and financial system structure in which banks operate. The institutional framework may affect the scope for
adverse selection and moral hazard by entrepreneurs, which is one of the crucial ingredients in the model of ?.
First, we use an indicator of the Depth of Information Sharing, which captures the difference in information
content between the credit registries in different countries. Credit registry institutions are public or private enti-
ties which collect information on the creditworthiness of borrowers and can help reduce both adverse selection
and moral hazard problems that are inherent to the lending business (? and ?). The index ranges between 0
and 6, with a higher value indicating that more information is available, and has an average of 3:9 across the
countries in our sample. As borrowers realize that it will be harder to get a loan at another institution when they
default on their current loan, they will have a stronger incentive to repay and they will choose a safer project
(?, ?).16 Hence, a first testable cross-country hypothesis is that in countries with better information sharing
systems an increase in market power is less detrimental to stability17, since better information sharing systems
will lower the entrepreneurs’ incentive to take more risk .
In addition, we consider financial structure and, more specifically, competition for banks coming from
financial markets. Specifically, we use Stock Market Turnover, i.e. the ratio of stocks traded to stocks
16? show for a sample of nearly 2400 banks in 69 countries that greater information sharing leads to higher bank profits and lowers
bank risk.
17The empirical result that a loss in market power is more detrimental for bank soundness when there is more information sharing
is also consistent with the theoretical predictions of ?. They show that changes in the information structure of the market can have a
significant impact on the likelihood of a banking crisis. More specifically, a reduction in the information asymmetries across banks
may lead to an easing of lending standards (less screening), a deterioration of bank portfolios, and more volatile profits. Moreover, they
show that the introduction of the threat of competition may actually induce the switch from screening to borrower pooling
13
listed, as an indicator of financial market development and thus an indicator of alternative funding sources for
enterprises. The turnover ranges from zero in countries without stock exchanges to over 16, with an average of
0.54. More developed stock markets make it easier for firms to switch between bank-based and market-based
funding. However, it also implies that firms who behave or default strategically (i.e., moral hazard) will suffer
reputation losses in other markets as well. Moreover, a stock listing also requires more information disclosure
and transparency (even in the absence of credit registries). This could lead to an additional effect of a change
in competition on bank risk behavior. This leads us to hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, it is less likely to find
a negative relationship between market power and bank stability in countries with well developed financial
markets. Stock market turnover and credit information sharing are positively and significantly correlated with
each other.
3.3.2 Regulatory and supervisory framework
A second group of country traits that influence the relationship between competition and stability consists of
regulation and supervision designed to protect bank charter values and to prevent risk-seeking behavior if char-
ters are eroded. Risk-adjusted deposit insurance or appropriate capital requirements would help to control risk
taking, even in the presence of intense competition (?, ?, ? and ?). These effects allow us to hypothesize that
more stringent (risk-based) capital regulation may limit the negative influence that competition may have on
stability. We therefore use a Capital Stringency index that indicates whether there are explicit requirements re-
garding the amount and source of capital that a bank should have.18 A higher index indicates greater stringency.
Capital Stringency ranges from 2 to 10, with an average of 5:8.
Another, popular regulatory measure to increase the stability of banking systems is deposit insurance, as it
reduces the risk of bank runs (?). On the other hand, too generous deposit insurance schemes or inappropriately
priced deposit insurance might increase moral hazard (see, e.g., ? and ?) since the safety net subsidy increases
the liquidation value of the bank. Thus, a generous deposit insurance system will increase banks’ risk-taking
18It measures the regulatory approach to assessing and verifying the degree of capital at risk in a bank. Specificaly, it includes
information on whether the source of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash, government securities,
or borrowed funds, and whether the authorities verify the sources of capital.
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incentives in more competitive environments. Deposit Insurance Coverage is proxied by deposit insurance
coverage relative to GDP per capita. Deposit insurance19 coverage ranges from less than 20% of GDP per
capita to more than 20 times GDP per capita; in the regressions we will use this variable in logs.
In addition to regulation, such as capital requirements and deposit insurance, effective banking supervision
is important. Monitoring banks is costly and difficult for both depositors and shareholders. Therefore, more
effective supervision should provide incentives to limit bank risk taking and thus could soften the effect of com-
petition on risk taking. Having Multiple Supervisors may lead to different supervisory approaches, which can
generate useful information which would otherwise be neglected (?). However, it might also lead to regulatory
arbitrage, exacerbating the effect of competition on stability. 16% of our sample observations (country-years)
have multiple bank supervisors. Banking supervision may be supplemented by external governance which
serves the same purpose. The External Governance Index includes information on the effectiveness of ex-
ternal audits, the transparency of financial statements and the evaluations by rating agencies and the incentives
for future monitoring by creditors. This variable thus serves as a proxy for the influence of private monitoring
mechanism. External Governance ranges from 6 to 16:5, with an average of 12:7.
Interestingly, these four indicators of the regulatory and supervisory framework are not strongly correlated
with each other. The correlation table, however, shows a positive and significant correlation between Depth of
Information Sharing and External Governance as well as between Stock Market Turnover and Multiple Super-
visors. Deposit Insurance Coverage is correlated with both proxies of institutional and financial development.
3.3.3 Herding and market structure
A third important country characteristic that can influence the relationship between competition and stability
is the covariation of banks’ behavior, also known as herding. From a supervisory perspective, an important
factor in deciding whether or not to intervene is whether the whole system or only a minor fraction of banks
are at risk. ? and ? show that the supervisory decision to intervene a failing bank is subject to an implicit
too-many-to-fail problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to
bail out some or all failed banks. This, however, gives banks incentives to herd and increases the risk that
19?’s model also implies an interaction effect between competition and deposit insurance.
15
many banks may fail together. Hence, herding behavior may affect banks’ incentives to increase risk-taking
in response to an increase in competition. In addition, ? and ? show that a lower correlation of loan defaults
makes it more likely that fiercer competition harms stability. When there is herding in risk-taking behavior,
there will be fewer idiosyncratic defaults and the assumption of perfectly correlated loan defaults becomes
more plausible. Therefore, if default correlation is high, we expect to see a reduction in the probability that the
competition-fragility view is favoured over the competition-stability model.
An indicator of the too-many-to-fail and herding problem is the aggregate Z-score, which is the country-
wide Z-score across all banks for a given year and country (i.e., how large is the aggregate capital buffer
against industry wide losses). This variable - Systemic Stability - ranges from 0.185 to 6.297, with an average
of 3.60˙4. An alternative indicator refers to activity restrictions, which may have the unwanted consequence
of encouraging herding, as they limit banks’ potential to venture in new markets if the bank faces fiercer
competition in its core market. The Activity Restrictions index measures the degree to which banks are
prohibited from engaging in fee-based activities related to securities, insurance and real estate and thus diversify
away from more traditional interest spread-based activities. Lower values of the index indicate that fewer
restrictions are placed on this type of diversification by banks; the index ranges from 4 to 15, with an average
of 9.5. Herding can also occur without activity restrictions. When some banks invest in one type of product
that generates high profits, other banks may be forced to imitate them, as otherwise shareholders will hold them
responsible for the lower profitability of the institution. Heterogeneous Bank Revenues measures whether
there are substantial revenue differences among financial institutions within a country and is calculated as the
within-country, within-year standard deviation of the non-interest income share. A higher value indicates that
there is less herding in revenues in the banking system. Heterogeneity-Revenues ranges from 0:031 to 0:340,
with a mean of 0:180 and a standard deviation of 0:059. Activity restrictions is negatively and significantly
correlated with both Heterogeneity-Revenues and Systemic Stability, i.e. countries with more homogenous
and riskier banking systems also experience higher activity restrictions, while the other two variables are not
correlated with each other.
The expected effects of these three sets of variables is summarized in the following table. The first column
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represents the variable of interest. The second column contains the expected impact on the market power-
soundness relationship (). In two cases, theory does not make unambiguous predictions and it will be to the
data to discriminate between competing hypotheses.
Variable Expected Impact on 
Institutional and financial development
Information Sharing +
Stock Market Development +
Regulation and Supervision
Capital Regulation  
Deposit Insurance +
Multiple Supervision + or  
External Governance  
Herding
Activity Restrictions +
Heterogeneous Bank Revenues  
Systemic Stability   or +
4 Results
In the following, we first present results on simple cross-country estimations of the competition-stability rela-
tionship, before exploring co-variates of cross-country, cross-time heterogeneity in this relationship. Finally,
we explore variation of the competition-stability relationship with specific bank characteristics.
4.1 Homogenous relationship between competition and stability
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Regression-based evidence on the relationship between bank market power and bank soundness is reported in
Table 5, where we assume a homogenous relationship between the two variables across countries and over time.
In this pooled cross-country setup, we regress the ln(Z-score) on the Lerner index and a set of control variables,
as described in regression equation (2) and impose that 1 = 0. This assumption will be relaxed below.
The results in column 1 of Table 5 show a positive and significant relationship between market power and
bank soundness. Put differently, an increase in competition, which erodes banks’ pricing power, increases
banks’ risk taking behavior and is hence detrimental for financial stability. This result is in line with existing
literature that also uses the Lerner index as a market power proxy (see, e.g., ?). In contrast to Figure 1, where
we identified the relationship in a time-series dimension, we now exclusively rely on the heterogeneity in the
variables within a country and a given year (as we include time-varying country fixed effects).
<Insert Table 5 around here>
The effect is not only statistically, but also economically large. As the dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of the Z-score, the point estimate can be interpreted as a semi-elasticity. A one-standard deviation
reduction in the Lerner index, which equals 0:142, is associated with a drop in the Z-score of 28%. Put dif-
ferently, the number of standard deviations profits have to fall before capital is depleted is reduced by 28% if
market power is reduced by one standard deviation.
We verify the sensitivity of this result in several robustness tests, available upon request. First, we verify
whether or not the results are dominated by countries that constitute the lion’s share of our sample and weigh
each observation with the inverse of the number of banks in the corresponding country.20 We again find a
positive and significant relationship between market power and bank stability, though with a slightly smaller
coefficient. Second, we confirm the results for the pre-2007 sample, which is hence not contaminated by the
exceptional events of the 2007-09 global financial crisis. Third, bank market power may be endogenous and
the estimated relationship may reflect reverse causality if bank failures affect market structure and possibly the
intensity of competition. While in all equations, we use lagged independent variables to address this possibility,
20To avoid overrepresentation of US banks in the pooled sample, we already limited the dominant presence of the US banks in the
sample. For each time period, we include the largest 100 US banks as well as 1500 randomly selected banks.
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we confirm the positive relationship between banks’ market power and stability including bank-fixed effects and
thus exploiting only within-bank variation over time. Finally, we confirm our results using IV (2SLS) regression
results, with loan growth, the cost-income ratio and lagged values of the Lerner index as instruments. The F-
statistic and J-statistic confirm the appropriateness of these instruments. In the pooled IV approach, we again
find a positive impact of market power on bank soundness. The estimated coefficient is only slightly larger
compared to the baseline case.
The results in column 2 of Table 5 show that the positive relationship between banks’ market power and
soundness is not spuriously created by regressing a price markup on a variable related to bank profitability. An
increase in market power is associated with less volatile profits, in line with the lower panel of Figure 1. More
market power (a higher Lerner index) is also positively affecting the capital to asset ratio, which is another
component of the Z-score (coumn 3).21 Next, we gauge the robustness of our findings to alternative measures
of bank soundness. In the fourth column of Table 5, we employ a Z-score where profit volatility is measured
over five-year rolling windows (instead of three years22). Even though the measure is different and the sample
size is reduced, we do not find that the relationship between competition and stability is significantly different
from the baseline approach in column 1.
In the following three columns of Table 5, we confirm the pooled sample evidence on the positive relation-
ship between market power and stability by looking at alternative bank-level competition measures. In column
five, we simultaneously include the subcomponents of the Lerner index, which is a relative markup of price
over marginal cost. The average price of bank activities is a proxy for market power in the loan market, while
the marginal cost is a proxy for the cost of funding (among other costs). Both price and marginal cost affect
21We do not report the results for the third component of Z-score, being ROA, as the link between profits and the Lerner index is
mainly mechanical (the coefficient is positive and significant), as we discussed in Section 3.2.3.
22In an additional robustness check, available upon request, we examine whether deleting banks with less than three years of data
affects our results. There are multiple reasons why banks are in the sample for only one or two years. Banks may have defaulted, they
could be de novo banks, large acquisitions may result in a new entity, etc. All of these explanations are related to either risk (default) or
competitiveness/market structure (entry or M&A). Hence, it may be a valid concern that this potentially introduces a sample selection
bias and affects our results. Therefore, we also estimate a Heckman selection model to account for this possible sample selection bias.
The results of the latter unreported test confirm that restricting the sample does not affect our results.
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banks’ risk-taking significantly and indicate that a reduction in the mark-up (more competition) originating
from prices, costs or both leads to less stability. In column six and seven, we include the loan market share
and market share in total assets23 in addition to the Lerner index (which proxies for market power). Banks with
more market power behave more prudently, while a large market share has a negative, but insignificant, impact
on bank soundness.24 In the last column we exclude loan loss provisions and annual asset growth as control
variables. These variables capture credit risk and asset expansion, which are in itself first order drivers of bank
risk. The coefficient of the Lerner index is slightly larger in this specification.
4.2 The competition-stability relationship across countries
So far, we have shown a conditional positive correlation between banks’ market power and soundness. Behind
this average relationship, however, is a large variation both over time and across countries, as illustrated in
Figures 2 and 3.
<Insert Figure 2 around here>
Figure 2 shows the coefficient estimate on  if the baseline regression (as in Equation (2)) is run separately
for each year in the sample period, including country fixed effects and the same group of bank-level control
variables as discussed above. We find a positive and significant relationship between market power and stability
across all years, but the estimated relationship varies significantly, with coefficient estimates ranging from over
three to (1995) to less than one (1998). The time variation in the estimated relationship is much lower from
2001 onwards.
<Insert Figure 3 around here>
Figure 3 shows the conditional correlation between banks’ market power and soundness across countries,
with a very similar finding. In the first panel of Figure 3, the height of the bars shows the magnitude of the
23Since we include time-varying country fixed effects and hence look at within country variation, there is a high correlation between
market share and bank size (and the rank correlation is perfect). Therefore, in the latter two specifications, we do not include bank size
as a separate regressor in the regression.
24If we do not include the Lerner index in the latter two columns, we obtain that market share picks up the effect of the Lerner index.
Market share has, in these unreported regressions, a positive and significant impact on bank soundness.
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coefficient of the Lerner index when estimating Equation 1 for each country separately, using ln(Z-score) as the
dependent variable. The coefficients that are significantly different from zero have a lighter shade. The average
of the 79 estimated coefficients equals 1:63. Hence, on average, it seems that the franchise value paradigm
dominates the risk-shifting hypothesis. The bar charts show that the conditional correlations in the left hand
side graph are positive in most countries. However, there is a large amount of heterogeneity in the competition-
stability relationship, ranging from a negative and significant relationship to a coefficient estimate of almost six.
The standard deviation of the coefficient across the 79 countries is 1:40. A quick look at the country labels25 on
the X-axis also reveals that it is not just a developed versus developing countries story or that countries within
specific regions exhibit similar behavior.
We also re-ran the regressions underlying Figure 3 using the negative of profit volatility for each country as
dependent variable. These results are reported in the right hand side graph. On average, the relationship is still
positive, although there are many more countries for which the estimated coefficient is negative compared to
using the ln(Z-score) as the dependent variable. The rank correlation between the two sets of country-specific
gauges of the market power-bank risk relation exceeds 0:90. Furthermore, a regression of one on the other
has an R-squared of 0:80 and a slope coefficient not significantly different from one. This again confirms that
the relationship between market power and fragility is not driven by having profitability in both dependent and
explanatory variable.26
4.3 The competition-stability relationship: explaining cross-country variation
We first compute the pairwise correlation between the country-specific market power-bank soundness estimates
(as reported in the left panel of Figure 3) and the different country characteristics. This creates some initial
insights in the sources of the cross-country heterogeneity in the market power-bank soundness relationship.
These correlations are reported in the last rows of Table 4. The results of this correlation analysis suggest
that competition is more harmful for stability in countries where (i) there are more effective systems of credit
25Info on the country names, labels and exact numbers can be found in Appendix B.
26These results are available upon request. Furthermore, the estimated intercept is not significantly different from 1:2 (point estimate
of 1.07 and standard error of 0.09), which is the difference in the coefficient on the Lerner index in columns 10 and 11 of Table 6, where
we further explore this robustness test.
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information sharing (pairwise correlation is 0:279), (ii) stock markets are more liquid (0:253), (iii) deposit
insurance is more generous (0:654), (iv) there are more restrictions on the permissible range of activities (0:511)
and (v) the banking system is more stable (0:429). The signs of the significant correlations are in line with the
theoretical predictions as explained in Section 3.3. Capital stringency, multiple supervisors, external governance
and herding in revenues are not significantly correlated with the estimated country-specific competition-stability
trade-off.
Table 6 documents that these preliminary findings of the correlation analysis are confirmed using regression
analysis to estimate equation (2). For ease of comparability of the economic significance, all country-specific
variables have again been normalized to have zero mean and unit variance, before interacting them with the
Lerner index.
<Insert Table 6 around here>
In the first nine columns of Table 6, we analyze one interaction term at a time. The results in Table 6 indicate
that the relationship between banks’ market power and soundness is, on average, positive. This relationship is
stronger in countries and periods where and when (i) there are more effective systems of credit information
sharing (ii) stock markets are more liquid, (iii) deposit insurance is more generous, (iv) there are multiple
supervisors, (v) there are more restrictions on the permissible range of activities, (vi) banks herd more in terms
of revenue structure and (vii) there is more systemic stability. When including the interaction of the Lerner
index with all variables simultaneously (column 10), we continue to find that the relationship between market
power and soundness is stronger in countries with more effective systems of credit information sharing, better
developed stock markets, more generous deposit insurance, higher activity restrictions and more stable banking
systems. This confirms the previously documented evidence of the correlation analysis.
Interestingly, the absolute value of the coefficients of the significant variables varies between 0:167 and
0:66. The coefficient on the Lerner index without interaction is 1:384. A one standard deviation increase in
one of these variables hence leads to a 14% to 31% change27 in the relationship between competition and
27A one standard deviation increase in the stock market turnover ratio (deposit insurance coverage) leads to an estimated impact of
Lerner on bank soundness of 1:51 (2:044). This is an 11% (39%) increase compared to the average bank in the average country, for
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fragility. The results in Table 6 are thus not only statistically, but also economically large. This is also indicated
in the right hand side part of the table. Specifically, we report the predicted  coefficients at the 5th and the
95th percentile of the respective country-specific characteristic. We note that in all cases, there is a positive
relationship between banks’ market power and soundness. The magnitude of the relationship, however, varies
significantly. For example, the magnitude of the market power-soundness relationship is more than twice as
high at the 95th percentile of deposit insurance generosity compared to the 5th percentile. A similarly large
difference in economic impact is obtained when switching the variables credit information sharing or activity
restrictions from the value at the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile.
Finally, the two cases mentioned in the lower end of these columns show the impact of a change in compe-
tition corresponding to one of the following two scenarios. Case 1 reports the predicted relationship between
banks’ market power and soundness for a country that is average for each of the country-specific variables. The
predicted value is 1:384. A one standard deviation increase in competition (drop in Lerner of 0:127) results
in a 17:6% lower Z-score. Case 2 resembles a fictitious post-crisis scenario with generous deposit insurance
schemes (1.65 standard deviations increase) and stronger restrictions on bank activities (a 1.65 standard devi-
ation increase), reflecting recent regulatory reforms or reform suggestions. Compared to the average country
(case 1), the relationship between banks’ market power and soundness is almost 110% higher, suggesting a very
negative impact of competition on stability in this scenario. In this scenario, the number of standard deviations
by which profits can fall before equity is depleted drops with 37% in response to a one standard deviation re-
duction in market power. The economic magnitude of this scenario analysis is similar if we restrict the sample
to pre-2007 observations.
4.4 Sign of the trade-off
The previous section documents a substantial amount of variation in the competition-stability relationship and
offers insight into the drivers of this heterogeneity. When using the Z-score as the dependent variable, we find
cross-country variation, but the relationship is almost always positive. Hence, one could argue that we mainly
confirm previous empirical evidence that showed that more competition is harmful for bank stability. However,
which the impact is 1:384.
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we offer two more important insights. First, even if the relationship between competition and stability would
not flip sign, the magnitude of this heterogeneity is economically important. A one-standard deviation change
in the Lerner index equals 0:127 (within country-year variation). For the average country (across countries,
the average coefficient is 1:63, as can be seen in Figure 3), this implies that a one-standard deviation reduction
in market power leads to a 21% reduction in the Z-score. The cross-country standard deviation in the market
power-stability relationship is 1:40. This implies that the impact of a similar change in market power varies
substantially across countries from almost zero (mean, 1:63, minus one standard deviation, 1:40) to almost 40%
(mean plus one standard deviation).
Second, while we follow most of the literature and use the Z-score as the bank soundness measure, we ac-
knowledge that this may cause a mechanical relationship. The Lerner index, our proxy for bank market power,
relies on bank profitability, which is also one of the constituents of the Z-score. Hence, we redo the entire
analysis and use the volatility of profits as the risk measure, thus avoiding the build-in or hard-wired relation-
ship between the Z-score and the Lerner index. We find that on average the relationship is still positive but much
lower. For almost half of the countries, the market power-stability relationship is negative or statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. More importantly, it does not affect the coefficient of the interaction terms. The results
in column 11 of Table 6 show that the interactions between country characteristics and banks’ market power, on
the one hand, and bank risk, on the other hand, are not driven by having a proxy of profitability/revenues in both
the dependent and explanatory variable. When using the negative of the denominator of the logarithmic Z-Score
(the log of the standard deviation of ROA), the coefficients on the interaction variables are similar in statistical
and economic importance as in column 10.28 Given its magnitude, the economic impact analysis documented
in the right hand side panel indicates that in some countries an increase in competition might lead to no effect
on bank soundness or even an increase in stability (rather than support for the franchise value hypothesis),
depending on the deposit insurance coverage, depth of information sharing and activity restrictions.
28We take the negative of profit volatility such that an increase also indicates more stability.
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4.5 Additional results: bank failure, contestability, globalization, and too big to fail
So far, we have exploited cross-country and time-series variation in the competition-stability relationship. How-
ever, banks’ risk-taking incentives might also be influenced by their own relative position in the market. Specif-
ically, we posit that failing banks have a greater incentive to exploit competition towards more aggressive risk-
taking. Further, banks with a larger market share that therefore consider themselves too-big-to-fail might also
exploit increasing competition to take more aggressive risks. Finally, banks in markets with varying degrees
of foreign-owned banks might react differently to changes in the competitive environment. This subsection
assesses whether such bank-level variation exists.
<Insert Table 7 around here>
Table 7 shows the relationship between competition and bank stability while controlling for the potential
impact of failing banks and banking crises. The first column shows our baseline competition-stability regres-
sion, as reported in column 10 of Table 6. In the second column, we interact the Lerner index with a distressed
exit dummy. The distressed exit dummy equals one for banks that make losses in the two years before the bank
exits the sample. In this way, we only capture the banks that actually were in distress before they leave the
sample. The significant and positive interaction term between competition and the exit dummy indicates that
banks that are in trouble before leaving the sample react more strongly to a change in competition. Thus, banks
that are in distress gamble even more than others when competition rises, probably because there is not much
left to loose for them. In the third regression, we only look at banks that did not exit the sample (Distressed
Exit Dummy=0), while adding interaction terms between the Lerner index and country-specific characteristics
that potentially influence the competition-stability relationship. The results show that market power still has a
positive impact on bank stability for these banks. Furthermore, as shown in our previous analysis, banks operat-
ing in a country with overall more effective systems of credit information sharing, generous deposit insurance,
higher activity restrictions and higher systemic stability react stronger to a change in competition. This shows
that our main results are not driven by bank-specific distress situations. In the last two columns, we control for
the potential impact of systemic banking crises. Based on ?, we create a dummy variable indicating whether a
country was experiencing a systemic banking crisis in a specific year. We then add an interaction term between
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this variable and the Lerner index to our baseline specification. Column 4 shows that adding this interaction
term has a limited impact. The systemic stability variable turns insignificant (because of the strong negative
correlation with the dummy variable), while all other results still hold. The interaction term itself is not sig-
nificant. In column 5 we control whether the recent financial crisis is driving our results. Therefore, we rerun
the regression on the pre-2007 period. The majority of our results still hold, only the credit information sharing
variable turns insignificant.
<Insert Table 8 around here>
Table 8 shows the results for the baseline competition-stability regression while controlling for the impact
of bank specialisation, bank market share and foreign bank presence. The first column retakes our baseline
results. In the second column, we restrict our sample to commercial banks only. Focussing on one particular
type of banks reduces concerns on the potential impact of differences in the regulatory framework for different
types of banks. We only look at commercial banks as they are the largest subgroup in our sample and allow us
to keep all countries in the sample. The results for the commercial banks mainly confirm our baseline results for
the full sample. The interaction term with two of the herding variables loses significance (activity restrictions
and systemic stability), but our other herding variable turns significant with the expected negative sign. In the
third column, we add a squared term of the Lerner index. Including the squared term does not affect the main
results on the interaction variables as can be inferred from comparing column 1 and 3. The only variable that
turns insignificant after including the squared Lerner variable is credit information sharing. We still obtain
that banks operating in a country with more generous deposit insurance, higher activity restrictions and higher
systemic stability react stronger to a change in competition. We estimate a significant and negative coefficient
on the squared term, suggesting a non-linear, inverse U-shaped relationship between market power and bank
soundness, which is in line with ?’s theoretical predictions. However, the relationship does not turn negative
until a value of 0:28 for the Lerner index is reached, which is more than one standard deviation above its
mean and does not turn significant and negative below 0:33 (which corresponds to only 5% of all bank-year
observations). In the subsequent tests, we always include the squared Lerner term to avoid that the measure of
market share and TBTF would spuriously pick up this effect. In the third column, we add the interaction of the
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Lerner index with a bank’s market share (measured in terms of total assets). This allows us to check whether
banks with a higher market share have an incentive to take more risk in more competitive environments, because
they can potentially see themselves as too-big-to-fail. Since we also include bank size, our interaction term only
captures the extent to which TBTF may affect bank incentives in response to changes in market power. The
results indicate that there is no direct too-big-to-fail effect influencing the competition-stability relationship.29
In the fifth column, we do a similar exercise, but now using a market share dummy that equals one for banks
with a market share that is larger than 10 percent. Again, we do not find a significant direct effect of a banks’
market share on the competition-stability relationship. In columns 6 and 7, we use the interaction of the Lerner
index with dummies indicating banks whose assets are above 10% or 25% of GDP of its home country. Banks
that are large relative to the country’s GDP are systemically important and could be perceived to be too-big-to-
fail. This may affect their risk-taking incentives as well as the Lerner index through lower funding costs. The
interaction enters significantly in neither case, indicating that these banks do not drive the results, nor behave
differently. Overall, we cannot find evidence that competition exacerbates the too-big-to-fail phenomenon.
In the last column, we interact the Lerner index with the share of foreign banks.30 Banking markets with a
higher fraction of foreign banks are more contestable, which should lead to more disciplining of the incumbent
banks. At the same time, the behavior of foreign banks is influenced not only by the structure and competition
in the local market, but also in the home and global market, thus reducing the impact of local market power
on risk-taking. We find a negative and significant interaction term between the Lerner index and the share of
foreign banks, suggesting that a higher share of foreign banks in the total number of banks reduces banks’
incentives to take on risks in response to a drop in market power.
29As mentioned at the end of the previous section, the findings are also robust to including banks’ market share and its interaction
with the same country-specific factors. Few of the interaction terms with banks’ market share are significant and their inclusion does
not affect the sign, size or significance of the interaction terms of the Lerner index with country-specific factors.
30Measured at the country level as the percentage of foreign banks among total banks, see ?. Unfortunately, our database does not
allow us to measure each bank’s foreign activities.
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We further subject our findings to a battery of unreported robustness tests.31 While the dependent variable
throughout our analysis is the Z-score in which the denominator, volatility of profits, is measured over a three
year interval, the results are robust to using a Z-score in which the denominator is measured using five year
rolling windows. The findings are also robust to including banks’ market share and its interaction with the
same country-specific factors. Few of the interaction terms with banks’ market share are significant and their
inclusion does not affect the sign, size or significance of the interaction terms of the Lerner index with country-
specific factors. We also run a regression in which we include year and country fixed effects (rather than their
interaction). In such a setup, we can also include the nine country characteristics as independent variables (in
addition to their interaction with the Lerner index). This alternative setup does not affect the findings on the
interaction terms. In addition, we find that banks are more stable in countries with stricter capital regulation, a
more stable banking system, less restrictions on the range of activities and a single supervisor.32 Furthermore,
dropping the loan loss provision ratio and asset growth from the set of bank-specific control variables leads to
a slightly higher coefficient on the Lerner index (as in the case without interaction terms, see the last column of
Table 5), but does not affect the interaction variables. Finally, the number of countries and observations vary in
each specification of Table 6 due to the availability and coverage of different country-specific characteristics.
When repeating the regressions reported in columns 1-10 using a common sample (the sample used in column
10), we obtain similar results.
5 Robustness and limitations of the dataset
In various sections of the paper, we talked about robustness tests or potential limitations of the analysis. In order
not to interrupt the flow of the paper, we only discussed them briefly. In what follows, we discuss these and
31We also conduct the regressions reported in Table 7 and Table 8 with the volatility of profits as the dependent variable. Almost all
results contrinue to hold.
32Hence, two of these country-specific factors affect the dependent variable directly, but the impact is related according to the level of
the Lerner index. We find that the negative impact of activity restrictions on bank soundness is reduced the more pricing power a bank
has. Hence, limiting the scope for expansion in non-traditional banking activities will harm the banks with limited market power and
may benefit banks with pricing power. Systemic stability has a positive effect on individual bank soundness and the effect is stronger
for banks with more market power.
28
other robustness tests in more detail. All results are available upon request but not reported to save on space.
5.1 Globalization
One potential limitation of the results and dataset might be that banks have expanded abroad in many dimen-
sions. Nowadays, banks may be funded with foreign deposits, originate foreign loans and are (partly) foreign-
owned. If banks operate internationally, they also compete internationally and price-cost margins should reflect
this. Moreover, this could create a harmonization of the competition-stability trade-off across countries, miti-
gating the scope for country-specific features to explain the remaining heterogeneity. As globalization increased
substantially over the sample period, we indeed observe a decrease over time in the cross-country variation in
the competition-stability relationship. The cross-country standard deviation in the competition-stability rela-
tionship reduces from 1:80 in the early sample years to approximately 1:30 for the latter part of the sample. The
main source of the reduction is the lower mass in the left tail of the competition-stability trade-off. The mini-
mum increases from  4 in the early sample years to  2 in the second half of the sample. Notwithstanding the
reduction in heterogeneity, the variability across countries is still sufficiently large to perform an investigation
into the sources of this variation.
The previous argument assumes that all banks within a country expand abroad to the same extent. This
may not be true. Most smaller banks still operate almost entirely domestically. As we use consolidated data,
this may create a wedge between the measurement of market power for domestic versus international banks.
Unfortunately, bank-level data on the decomposition of assets and liabilities in domestic or cross-border origin
is not available.33 Assuming that there is a strong correlation between size and foreign activities, we run several
robustness checks, both on the specification with and without the interaction terms. We run a regression where
we exclude the 10 (20) largest banks of each country, where the top 10 (20) is allowed to change every year. We
also run a regression on a reduced sample of banks that have a cumulative market share (after sorting on market
share from low to high, by country and on a yearly basis) of less than 50% (20%), such that we only focus
on the smallest banks in a country. The results are similar for these samples of banks which contain mainly
33? recently constructed a database on international banking, but only focus on the ownership structure. However, this need not be
informative on cross-border loans or funding.
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domestically oriented banks.
5.2 Reconciling seemingly conflicting empirical evidence
The majority of the existing papers finds support for the franchise value hypothesis. On the other hand,
? obtain support for the competition-stability view. Our setup and results may provide a framework
to rationalize the seemingly conflicting findings. For example, ? only include developing countries in
their cross-country setup.34 However, the amount of information sharing and the liquidity of the stock
market is significantly lower in developing countries compared to the countries they omit (US, Japan and
Western Europe). In our sample, the difference between the average value of these two indicators in both
groups is approximately 0:7 standard deviation (for both measures). These factors mostly affect the risk-
shifting incentives of the entrepreneurs. In addition, deposit insurance coverage is also significantly lower
in the developing countries. The difference in means is 0:32 standard deviations with the omitted group
of developed countries. The results in column 11 of Table 6 indicate that on average the coefficient of the
Lerner index is 0:199. However, a 0:70 standard deviation reduction in information sharing and stock
market liquidity and a 0:32 drop in deposit insurance coverage yields a coefficient of 0:32.35 Our results
thus indicate that, compared to the average country, combining these three effects can eventually lead to
a negative impact of the Lerner index on profit volatility, which is in line with the competition-stability
view. When doing a similar analysis on the point estimates of column 10 of Table 6, we see an equally
large drop in the implied market power-bank soundness relationship. However, the point estimate now
drops from an average impact of 1:38 to 0:87, which is still significantly positive (but also affected by the
hard-wired effect of profitability). Therefore, we would like to stress that we focus more on the magnitude
of the cross-country variation rather than the exact sign (as the latter is measure specific and the former
is not).
34There are also other differences. We use a bank level measure of market power whereas they use a country-level indicator of
concentration (HHI). In contrast to concentration indices, the Lerner index does not necessarily imply defining the relevant banking
market. In addition, market structure does not need to be related to market power, as has been shown in other studies (see e.g. ?)
35I.e.: 0:20   0:70  0:32   0:70  0:13   0:32  0:64, and putting all other interaction terms at zero (as the country variables are
standardized).
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5.3 Limiting market power
We document that certain country-specific characteristics mitigate or amplify the effect of market power on sta-
bility and conclude from this that these country characteristics create heterogeneity in the competition-stability
relationship. An alternative explanation would be that certain types of regulation affect the extent to which
banks can exercise market power. While time-varying country fixed effects absorb the direct effect of various
regulations on the level of competition (and stability), it may still be that these regulations lead to the absence of
within-country variation in banks’ market power and hence artificially drive down the impact of market power
on stability (as there would be little variation in the independent variable). To check the validity of this argu-
ment, we first compute the variation in the Lerner index for each country and year. Subsequently, we regress this
variation on the country characteristics used in our analysis. A number of conclusions can be drawn from this
analysis. First, the R-squared of such a regression is low (0:13), indicating that the within country-year variation
in banks’ pricing power is largely unaffected by the country-characteristics. Second, while some coefficients
are significant, they are quite small and leading to a low economic impact. As all right hand side variables are
standardized, we see for instance that even a four standard deviation decrease in deposit insurance would only
lead to a drop in the standard deviation of the Lerner index from 0:14 to 0:11, which is still sufficiently large
such as not to cause an automatic zero relationship between market power and bank stability.
5.4 Z-Score decomposition
Other papers have looked at different risk metrics or competition measures. Throughout the paper, we have
motivated substantially why the Lerner and the Z-score are our preferred market power and risk measures.
Nevertheless, we have run numerous robustness checks. We decompose the Z-score in its constituents and
find that a higher Lerner index increases bank profits, as well as lowers the volatility of profits. Moreover,
banks with more market power also hold higher capital buffers (see results reported in Table 5). The latter
finding is in line with ?.36 Hence, the Lerner index is significantly related with each of the three components
36A positive relationship between market power and bank capital is in line with the franchise value hypothesis but in contrast to for
instance ?. However, the strong and positive relationship between the Lerner index and capital ratio is also in line with stylized empirical
facts about corporate (and bank) capital structure (see e.g.: ?, ?). Firms/banks with higher profits (e.g. due to more pricing power)
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of the Z-score individually, with the expected sign. In addition, we check the robustness of the results when we
include the capital ratio as an independent variable. We compare the results obtained by including the capital
ratio in four alternative specifications (specification with and without interaction between Lerner and country
characteristics; combined with alternating the Z-score and profit volatility as the dependent variable). All the
results reported in the paper still hold. Hence, controlling for bank capital in either a specification with or
without a possible mechanical relationship (due to profitability) between the Lerner index and bank risk does
not affect the results regarding the sources of cross-country variation in the competition-fragility relationship.
We also document throughout the paper that the impact of country characteristics on the market power-bank
soundness relationship is similar when using either the Z-score or profit volatility as the dependent variable.
5.5 Endogeneity
The relationship between market power and bank risk-taking might be endogenous. We try to control for its
potential impact in various ways, including by using lagged values for the explanatory variables and using
instrumental variables. In this final robustness test, we combine an instrumental variable approach with bank-
fixed effects. We use the cost-to-income ratio, market share  bank sector concentration, and loan growth as
instruments. The choice of instruments is motivated by ? who has developed a new measure of competition
that incorporates the idea that competition favors efficient firms. Hence, the cost-to-income ratio, a proxy for
cost efficiency, should be a good instrument for market power. The interaction between market power and
concentration is included as it has been shown by ? that one of the main factors affecting banks’ franchise
values is its market share in a weakly concentrated market. As ?, we also use loan growth as an instrument, the
idea being that a strong increase in loan growth can be one of the characteristics of a more aggressive institution.
will be able to manage their capital ratio ‘passively’ by means of retained earnings (or dividend distributions), rather than deciding to
change leverage actively via external funding. The choice between active and passive capital management (and hence the relationship
between the Lerner index and bank capital) will also be affected by country characteristics. Passive management will be more frequent
in countries where external financing is more costly (less liquid stock markets), whereas earnings retention may be less in countries
where the principal agent problem between bank equityholders and debtholders is larger (more deposit insurance reduces monitoring
incentives). We leave a detailed analysis of the impact of country characteristics on the profit (market power)-bank capital relationship
for further research.
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?, for example, show that banking deregulation in the U.S. led to higher growth in credit card loans. In addition,
we also include bank fixed effects to mitigate reverse causality or endogeneity stemming from time-invariant
bank-specific heterogeneity such as ownership characteristics or a time-invariant international focus.37 The
results are reported in Table 9 and confirm the previous findings. The dependent variable in the first column is
the Z-score, while we use the inverse of the denominator of the Z-score (minus the logarithm of the standard
deviation of profit volatility) as a dependent variable in the second column. The last two columns are similar
to the first two but also include instrumented interaction effects, and are hence the counterpart of the results
reported in the last two columns of Table 6, while controlling for endogeneity by means of bank fixed effects
and instrumental variables. The statistical and economic significance of the coefficient estimates is similar to
the ones reported in Table 6, confirming that our findings are not driven by endogeneity.
6 Conclusion
This paper documents significant cross-country heterogeneity in the competition-stability relationship. While,
on average, it seems that the franchise-value paradigm dominates the risk-shifting hypothesis, this full sample
relationship hides a substantial amount of cross-country heterogeneity, with estimates ranging from significantly
negative, over insignificant to mostly strong positive relationships between market power and stability.
We develop a framework to assess how regulation, supervision and other institutional factors may make it
more likely that the data favor one theory over the other, i.e. the charter-value paradigm over the risk-shifting
paradigm. We show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks’ risk taking incentives in
countries with stricter activity restrictions, more homogenous bank revenue structures, more generous deposit
insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. Our findings help understand the seem-
ingly conflicting empirical evidence. Most studies tend to find results in favour of the competition-fragility
view. However, if one would sample banks from countries/regions with less strict activity restrictions and
37Unfortunately the latter information is not available in the database and is infeasible to hand-collect for such a large scale database.
For example, ? hand collect information on governance, but they limit the sample to the 10 largest banks in a limited number of
countries (244 banks in total)
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capital regulations, less homogenous bank revenue structures, no deposit insurance and credit registries, ob-
taining insignificant or the opposite result need not be inconsistent. Understanding the market, regulatory and
institutional framework in which banks operate is thus critical in gauging the effect of competition on stability.
Our findings have important policy repercussions. They suggest that activity restrictions and herding trends
can exacerbate the negative impact of competition on bank stability so that regulatory reforms have to take
this into account. We show that the too-many-to-fail phenomenon is worse in more competitive environments.
They also stress the importance of the moral hazard risk of generous deposit insurance, exacerbated in more
competitive environments. In the midst of the 2007-2009 crisis, many countries increased the generosity of
the deposit insurance schemes. At the same time, there were calls for restrictions on banks’ activities (as was
the case after the Great Depression when the U.S. imposed the Glass-Steagall Act). Mimicking this post-crisis
scenario in a fictitious ceteris paribus analysis reveals that the relationship between market power and soundness
is almost twice as strong compared to the benchmark case, suggesting a very negative impact of competition
on stability in this scenario. In the base scenario, a one standard deviation reduction in market power leads
to a drop in the Z-score of 17:6%. In our fictitious post-crisis scenario, a similar loss in market power leads
to a 37% reduction in the average Z-score (which is the buffer of capital against losses expressed in terms of
profit volatility). In the post-crisis scenario with more generous deposit insurance in place, the sensitivity of the
Z-score (or profit volatility) to changes in the Lerner index has increased. Whether this ultimately is good or
bad depends on the direction of the change in the Lerner index. If banks’ pricing power has been reduced after
the crisis, then our results indicate that the regulatory changes after the crisis aggravated the negative impact on
bank instability. Our findings underline the importance of regulatory policies and market structure for stability.
In addition to a direct effect of these policies on risk-taking incentives of banks, they also have an indirect effect
by dampening or exacerbating the effect of competition on banks’ riskiness.
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Figure 1: Evolution over Time of Market Power, Bank Stability and Profit Volatility
This graph contains information on the relationship between bank market power and bank soundness. The upper figure shows the evolution
over time of our two main variables of interest: market power and bank soundness. Market power is proxied by the Lerner index, which is the
relative markup of price over marginal cost. Bank soundness is captured by the natural logarithm of the Z-score. The Z-score equals the sum of
equity over total assets and return on assets divided by the three year rolling standard deviation of return on assets. Both indicators are initially
calculated at the bank-year level and then averaged by country on a yearly basis between 1994 and 2009. The plotted lines correspond with
the yearly averages of these cross-country averages. The evolution of the Z-score is shown on the left axis, whereas the evolution of the Lerner
index is shown on the right axis. The lower figure depicts the evolution, between 1994 and 2009, of the Lerner index and the volatility of return
on assets, which is the denominator of the Z-score. The volatility of bank profits (ROA) is again calculated on a three year rolling window
basis. Again, we first compute this measure by bank-year observation, before averaging first at the country-year level and subsequently by time
period.
Figure 2: Evolution over Time of the Conditional Correlation between Bank Market Power and Stability
This graph shows the evolution of the conditional correlation between a bank market power measure and a bank stability
measure between 1994 and 2009. Bank market power is proxied by the Lerner index, which is the relative markup of
price over marginal cost. Bank soundness is captured by the logarithm of the Z-score, which equals the number of
standard deviations bank profits have to fall before the equity cushion is depleted. The height of the bars shows the
magnitude of the coefficient of the Lerner index when running year-by-year regressions of the Z-score on the Lerner
index, and a group of bank-specific control variables. We also include country fixed effects to control for unobserved
effects at the country level. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. All depicted correlations are
significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 1: Bank-specific Variables: Summary Statistics
This table shows the total sample summary statistics for the bank specific variables used throughout the paper. Bank specific data is
retrieved from the Bureau Van Dijck Bankscope database. The full sample contains 80822 observations. The table consists of three
parts. The first panel contains information on the mean and standard deviation of the variables that are used as control variables in the
competition - stability regressions. The impact of banks’ business model on bank soundness is proxied via its funding structure (share
of wholesale funding equals the share of money market funding in money market funding and total deposits), asset mix (loans to total
assets) and revenue composition (non-interest income in total income). We also control for bank size, credit risk (loan loss provisions to
total interest income) and bank strategy (annual growth in total assets). We have three types of banks in our sample: Commercial Banks,
Cooperative Banks and Savings Banks. The second panel summarizes the variables that are needed to construct the Lerner index. The
Lerner index is the relative markup of price over marginal cost. The average price of bank activities equals the ratio of total revenues
over total assets. Marginal costs are obtained after estimating a translog cost function. Using a translog specification, we relate banks’
total operating cost to three input prices (price of fixed assets, price of labor and price of funding). They are constructed as respectively
the share of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets, the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets and the ratio of
interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding. The third panel contains information on the main variables of interest:
market power and bank riskiness. Market power is proxied by the Lerner index, whereas our bank stability indicator is the natural
logarithm of the Z-score. The Z-score is calculated as the sum of equity over total assets and return on assets divided by the three year
rolling standard deviation of return on assets. For all variables, we depict the full sample standard deviation. In the lower panel, we
also provide additional information on the variation of market power and bank soundness (i) across bank averages, (ii) within banks,
i.e. after subtracting the bank-specific mean, (iii) across banks after subtracting the country-year average, and (iv) between countries
(after averaging over banks within a country).
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Determinants of Bank Soundness
Share of Wholesale Funding 0.0559 0.1347
Loans to Total Assets 0.5830 0.1882
Non-Interest Revenue Share 0.2635 0.1763
ln(Total Assets) 6.4467 1.857
Loan Loss Provisions to Interest Income 0.1496 0.1926
Annual Growth in Total Assets 0.1028 0.2534
Commercial Bank dummy 0.5335 0.4989
Cooperative Bank dummy 0.2822 0.4501
Savings Bank dummy 0.1844 0.3878
Translog Cost Function
Total Operating Cost 280.3789 877.9428
Price of Fixed Assets 1.7468 3.2794
Price of Labor 0.0158 0.0097
Price of Funding 0.0411 0.0338
Average Price of bank activities 0.0769 0.0419
Marginal Cost 0.0672 0.0386
Bank Soundness and Market Power
ln(Z-score) 4.0064 1.321
Between Bank Variation 1.108
Within Bank Variation 0.841
Within Country-Year variation 1.146
Between Country Variation 0.532
Lerner 0.1239 0.143
Between Bank Variation 0.138
Within Bank Variation 0.089
Within Country-Year variation 0.127
Between Country Variation 0.060
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Table 2: Bank Competition and Market Structure Measures: Correlations
This table provides information on the correlation between various proxies of bank market power, market structure and competi-
tion. Correlation measures are obtained at the country-year level. All competition or market structure measures are constructed
such that an increase indicates more market power or concentration. If a variable varies at a more detailed level (e.g. the Lerner
index varies at the bank level) it is first averaged at the time-country level. The Lerner index is a bank-specific, time-varying
measure of market power. It is calculated as the relative markup of price over marginal costs. Market Share is the average
market share of a bank in a country in a given year, based on total assets. In this table, we use the inverse of the number of
banks, such that a higher value indicates an increase in market concentration. HHI(TA) is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index
of concentration of total assets. It measures market concentration by adding the squares of the market shares of all banks in a
country. The more disperse the market structure, the lower this value will be. CR3 is an alternative concentration measure. It
reflects the market share of the three largest banks in a country. The last measure is the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, which is an
estimated structural competition measure. The estimations are done at the country level over five year rolling windows. We take
the negative of the H-statistic, such that a higher value also indicates an increase in market power. p-values are in parentheses.
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Market Share 0.114
(0.000)
Inverse(number of banks) 0.132 0.352
(0.000) (0.000)
HHI(TA) 0.028 0.134 0.165
(0.351) (0.000) (0.000)
CR3 0.072 0.229 0.154 0.887
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-H-statistic 0.135 -0.003 -0.060 -0.004 0.021
(0.000) (0.932) (0.054) (0.893) (0.498)
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Table 7: Failing Banks and Banking crises
This table shows regression results for the competition-stability trade-off while controlling for the impact of distressed
banks and banking crises. The first column replicates the results from column 10 in table 6, i.e. regressing the Z-
score on the Lerner index and all interaction terms between the Lerner index and the country-specific variables, while
controlling for bank-specific characteristics and country-year fixed effects. In the second and the third regression, we
add an interaction term of the Lerner index with an exit dummy. For the second regression, the exit dummy equals
one in the two years before the bank leaves the sample. Notice that this dummy does not discrimate between defaults
and distressed mergers on the one hand and ’normal’ mergers or acquisitions on the other hand. Therefore, in the third
regression, the exit dummy only equals one in the two years before a bank leaves the sample if the bank had a negative
ROA in that period. In this way, we only capture the banks that actually were in distress before they leave the sample.
In the fourth regression, we only look at banks that did not exit the sample due to a distressed situation (Distressed
Exit Dummy =0). In column five and six we control for the potential impact of a banking crisis. In column 5 we
interact the Lerner index with a systemic banking crisis dummy defined as in Laeven and Valencia (2010). Column 6
shows the results when limiting our sample to the pre-2007 period. For each regression, error terms are clustered at the
country-year level.
VARIABLES Baseline Distressed Exit Not Distressed Crisis Indicator Pre2007
Lerner index 1.384*** 1.214*** 1.090*** 1.383*** 1.477***
(0.121) (0.126) (0.137) (0.117) (0.116)
Depth of Information Sharing 0.253* 0.261* 0.313** 0.253* 0.191
x Lerner (0.146) (0.143) (0.159) (0.146) (0.136)
Stock Market Turnover 0.167** 0.0906 0.0291 0.166* 0.0440
x Lerner (0.0796) (0.0733) (0.0946) (0.0919) (0.103)
Capital Stringency 0.0436 0.0848 0.137 0.0436 0.0713
x Lerner (0.0881) (0.0848) (0.101) (0.0876) (0.0817)
Deposit Insurance Coverage 0.660*** 0.602*** 0.759*** 0.659*** 0.610***
x Lerner (0.125) (0.115) (0.138) (0.153) (0.114)
Multiple Supervisors -0.0388 -0.0490 -0.0456 -0.0389 -0.0793
x Lerner (0.0748) (0.0696) (0.0833) (0.0747) (0.0778)
External Governance Index -0.00701 -0.0380 -0.0427 -0.00719 -0.163
x Lerner (0.126) (0.122) (0.143) (0.130) (0.125)
Activity Restrictions 0.283*** 0.236** 0.309*** 0.283*** 0.293***
x Lerner (0.101) (0.0969) (0.104) (0.100) (0.103)
Heterogeneous Bank Revenues -0.0810 -0.0998 -0.00480 -0.0809 -0.0145
x Lerner (0.130) (0.126) (0.136) (0.132) (0.132)
Systemic Stability 0.171** 0.241*** 0.234** 0.172 0.313***
x Lerner (0.0859) (0.0752) (0.0954) (0.120) (0.0929)
Last Observation Distressed 1.399***
x Lerner (0.212)
Systemic Banking Crisis Dummy 0.00573
x Lerner (0.413)
Constant 3.914*** 3.958*** 3.990*** 3.914*** 3.840***
(0.101) (0.0979) (0.0974) (0.101) (0.0957)
Observations 75333 75333 73233 75333 61870
R-squared 0.320 0.322 0.285 0.320 0.305
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES
Type dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Year x Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Robustness test - Contestability, globalization, too big to fail and bank specialisation
This table shows regression results for the competition-stability trade-off while controlling for the potential impact of nonlinearities, a
banks’ market share, too big to fail status and bank specialisation. The first column replicates the results from column 10 in table 6, i.e.
regressing the Z-score on the Lerner index and all interaction terms between the Lerner index and the country-specific variables, while
controlling for bank-specific characteristics and country-year fixed effects. In the second column, we limit our sample to commercial banks
only. Using this subset limits the possibility that our results are driven by differences in regulation for the different types of banks in our
baseline sample. In the following columns, we expand our baseline regression with extra interaction terms. In the third column we control
for non-linearities in the competition-stability relationship by adding a squared Lerner index. Doing so, we reduce the possibility that the
other interaction terms are picking up a non-linear effect. In regression four and five we take into account the potential impact of a banks’
market share by adding an interaction term of the Lerner index with a banks‘ market share (column 4) or a dummy indicating whether
the bank has a market share that is higher than 10 percent (column 5). In the following two regressions, we control for the impact of
too-big-to-fail banks. We proxy too-big-to-fail by the ratio of bank size to a country’s GDP. We construct a dummy indicating whether this
ratio is higher than 10 or 25 percent. We then interact this dummy with the Lerner index to see whether these banks react differently to a
change in competition. In the last column we control for the potential impact of the presence of foreign banks. For each regression, error
terms are clustered at the country-year level.
VARIABLES Baseline Commercial Lerner Market Share Large TBTF10 TBTF25 Foreign
Banks Market Share Banks
Lerner 1.384*** 1.429*** 1.725*** 1.748*** 1.730*** 1.734*** 1.732*** 1.604***
(0.121) (0.116) (0.108) (0.123) (0.113) (0.112) (0.110) (0.105)
Depth of Information Sharing 0.253* 0.333** 0.147 0.141 0.146 0.145 0.146 0.0808
x Lerner (0.146) (0.142) (0.122) (0.125) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.127)
Stock Market Turnover 0.167** 0.244*** 0.137** 0.130* 0.135** 0.134** 0.135** 0.0945
x Lerner (0.0796) (0.0725) (0.0677) (0.0679) (0.0677) (0.0676) (0.0676) (0.0715)
Capital Stringency 0.0436 0.0588 0.00250 -0.00243 0.00118 -0.000848 -0.00122 -0.0520
x Lerner (0.0881) (0.0888) (0.0779) (0.0772) (0.0775) (0.0775) (0.0776) (0.0801)
Deposit Insurance Coverage 0.660*** 0.587*** 0.389*** 0.388*** 0.389*** 0.387*** 0.385*** 0.320***
x Lerner (0.125) (0.129) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112)
Multiple Supervisors -0.0388 -0.0857 0.0235 0.0229 0.0234 0.0231 0.0229 0.0727
x Lerner (0.0748) (0.0690) (0.0664) (0.0662) (0.0663) (0.0663) (0.0664) (0.0706)
External Governance Index -0.00701 -0.00473 -0.0125 -0.00846 -0.0113 -0.00910 -0.00977 0.144
x Lerner (0.126) (0.134) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104)
Activity Restrictions 0.283*** 0.126 0.249*** 0.254*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.281***
x Lerner (0.101) (0.0977) (0.0880) (0.0887) (0.0883) (0.0882) (0.0880) (0.0884)
Heterogeneous Bank Revenues -0.0810 -0.399*** -0.0712 -0.0719 -0.0716 -0.0713 -0.0699 -0.0162
x Lerner (0.130) (0.104) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115)
Systemic Stability 0.171** 0.0834 0.353*** 0.348*** 0.352*** 0.353*** 0.354*** 0.341***
x Lerner (0.0859) (0.0666) (0.0729) (0.0732) (0.0730) (0.0731) (0.0730) (0.0749)
Lerner -3.082*** -3.077*** -3.081*** -3.080*** -3.081*** -3.030***
x Lerner (0.314) (0.315) (0.314) (0.314) (0.314) (0.310)
Market Share -1.509
x Lerner (1.687)
Dummy Large Market Share -0.0918
x Lerner (0.191)
I(Size/GDP > 10%) -0.191
x Lerner (0.223)
I(Size/GDP > 25%) -0.355
x Lerner (0.285)
Foreign banks -0.338***
x Lerner (0.0920)
Constant 3.914*** 4.041*** 4.044*** 4.038*** 4.043*** 4.040*** 4.041*** 4.043***
(0.101) (0.0748) (0.0919) (0.0953) (0.0933) (0.0942) (0.0933) (0.0944)
Observations 75333 38134 75333 75333 75333 75333 75333 73669
R-squared 0.320 0.304 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Type dummies YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year x Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: IV regressions
This table shows the results for our baseline regression and the interaction term regression when using an IV approach.
In column one and two, we run a regression similar to the first column in table V, but we instrument the Lerner index
by loan growth, the cost-income ratio and an interaction term between the Herfindahl index (based on total assets) and
a banks market share (also based on total assets). The dependent variable in the first column is the Z-score, while
we use the inverse of the denominator of the Z-score (minus the standard deviation of the volatility of profits) as a
dependent variable in the second column. Both regressions are estimated using bank and time dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank level. For column three and four, we use a two stage regression approach. In the first
stage, we regress the Lerner index on loan growth, the cost-income ratio ,an interaction term between the Herfindahl
index (based on total assets) and a bank’s market share (also based on total assets), a group of bank-specific control
variables and bank dummies. In the second stage, we use the instrumented values of the Lerner index and interact it
with country-specific variables which enter as independent variables. The last two columns are hence the counterpart
of the results reported in the last two columns of Table 6, but control for endogeneity by means of bank fixed effects
and instrumental variables.
VARIABLES ln(Z-score) -ln(sdROA) ln(Z-score) -ln(sdROA)
Lerner 1.814*** 1.290*** 2.296*** 0.897***
(0.0862) (0.0796) (0.145) (0.135)
Depth of Information Sharing 0.431*** 0.435***
x Lerner (0.144) (0.128)
Stock Market Turnover 0.177* 0.233**
x Lerner (0.104) (0.102)
Capital Stringency -0.134 -0.246**
x Lerner (0.118) (0.113)
Deposit Insurance Coverage 0.390** 0.393***
x Lerner (0.160) (0.144)
Multiple Supervisors -0.192 -0.0505
x Lerner (0.124) (0.117)
External Governance Index -0.155 -0.0182
x Lerner (0.186) (0.168)
Activity Restrictions 0.827*** 0.708***
x Lerner (0.145) (0.137)
Heterogeneity - Revenues -0.0244 0.199
x Lerner (0.162) (0.161)
Systemic Stability 0.195 0.189
x Lerner (0.128) (0.128)
Constant 3.933*** 1.215***
(0.0929) (0.124)
Observations 76,592 76,752 74,942 74,942
R-squared 0.052 0.041 0.312 0.432
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
Bank Dummies YES YES YES YES
instruments Cost to Income, Loan Growth, MS x HHI
Control Variables YES YES YES YES
Year x Country dummies YES YES YES YES
Number of Countries 79 79 79 79
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C Appendix - Estimating marginal cost using a translog cost function
As ?, we model the total operating cost of running the bank as a function of a single, aggregate output proxy,
Qi;t, and three input prices, wji;t, with j 2 f1; 2; 3g. More specifically, we estimate:
lnCi;t = 0+1 lnQi;t+2(lnQi;t)
2+
3X
j=1
j lnw
j
i;t+
3X
j=1
3X
k=1
j;k lnw
j
i;t lnw
k
i;t+
3X
j=1
j lnw
j
i;t lnQi;t+vt+"i;t
(C.1)
in which Ci;t measures total operating costs (interest expenses, personnel and other administrative or operating
costs), Qi;t represents a proxy for bank output or total assets for bank i at time t. The three input prices w
capture the price of fixed assets (w1), the price of labor (w2) and the price of borrowed funds (w3). They are
constructed as, respectively, the share of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets, the ratio
of personnel expenses to total assets and the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market
funding. Following ?, the cost function is estimated separately for each country in the sample over the sample
period to reflect potentially different technologies. We also include time dummies to capture technological
progress as well as varying business cycle conditions, and a bank specialization dummy. Homogeneity of
degree one in input prices is obtained by imposing the restrictions:
3X
j=1
j = 1;
3X
j=1
j = 0 and 8
k 2 f1; 2; 3g :
3X
j=1
j;k = 0. Marginal cost is then obtained as follows:
MCi;t =
@Ci;t
@Qi;t
=
Ci;t
Qi;t
0@b1 + 2b2 lnQi;t + 2X
j=1
bj ln wji;tw3i;t
1A (C.2)
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